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ARTICLES
REACH OUT AND BUG SOMEONE: CALIFORNIA'S
NEW WIRETAP LAW
Philip H. Pennypacker*
Those who would sacrifice liberty for a small amount of secur-
ity, deserve neither.
-Benjamin Franklin
Approximately twenty years after Title III of the federal Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act' was enacted, California
adopted the Presley-Felando-Eaves Wiretap Act.' Against a back-
drop of increasing crime control and the need for broader intelligence
gathering, both Acts permit law enforcement personnel to delve into
what are believed to be the inner workings of criminal operations.
The independent development of the Acts was strikingly simi-
lar. For many years prior to their enactment, the United States Su-
preme Court, Congress, the California Supreme Court and the Cali-
fornia Legislature each adopted strict bans on wiretapping and on
the invasion of privacy that results from a wiretapping.' Because of
© Philip H. Pennypacker
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of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A., 1969, University of California at Santa
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1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521; Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982)) [hereinafter Title III].
2. Chapter 111, 1988 Cal. Legis. Serv. 371 (West 1988), filed with Secretary of State
May 23, 1988. [hereinafter California Act].
3. The United States Supreme Court had rejected wiretap actions by the prosecution in
the following cases: Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). A total ban had been implemented by the Congress in 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958). In
California, the case of People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955) and CAL.
PENAL CODE § 631 (West 1988 & Supp. 1989) forbade interception. California efforts to gain
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the general feeling that conversations should be candid and confiden-
tial, national and state proposals to relax these bans experienced
tough sledding.
In the congressional arena, unsuccessful attempts were made in
the early 1950's to relax the ban.4 In California, bills introduced as
early as 1970 met with similar failure.5
But in 1968, when the country was confronted with "crime in
the streets,'.' a "nation gone haywire" and "gangsters on the loose,"
Congress successfully enacted Title III. Twenty years later, when
California faced the proliferation of crime involving modern drug
distribution and a "state addicted to drugs," the California Legisla-
ture followed suit and adopted the Presley-Felando-Eaves Wiretap
Act. The primary focus of the California Act is the interception of
wire communications relative to drug transactions.
This article is an overview of the statutory requirements of the
California Act. It will discuss the requirements judicially derived
under Title III that will likely be applied in California and will
explore new issues likely to be litigated in California.
While a majority of persons view electronic surveillance as re-
pugnant, the sad truth is that when confronted with an option to
suppress crime or to ensure liberty, most persons would prefer the
former. Thus, even though these acts violate every fundamental con-
cept of liberty, the experience of Title III suggests that the Califor-
nia Act will survive most legislative and judicial attacks and specific
smaller provisions of the California Act will be tested on a case-by-
case basis.
I. THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION
The California statute, Penal Code Section 629, establishes a
procedure whereby the state's top law enforcement officials may ap-
ply to the presiding judge of the superior court, or another desig-
nated judge, for an interception of a wire communication. 6 Essen-
tially, the application process parallels the procedures mandated
under the federal Act. The application must disclose:
a. The law enforcement agency seeking the wiretap.'
a wiretap act stemmed from 1970.
4. See Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping, The Politics of "Law
and Order," 67 MICH. L. REV. 455 n.1 (1969).
5. REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY (April 20, 1988).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629 (West Supp. 1989).
7. Id. § 629(a).
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b. The agency empowered to execute the order.8
c. A certification that the facts have been reviewed by a chief
executive officer making the application.'
d. A "full and complete" review of the "facts and circum-
stances" leading to the application, including:
1. Details regarding the offense(s) committed or about to
be committed.1"
2. Why conventional investigative techniques have failed or
why they would be unsuccessful or too dangerous."
3. A description of the nature and location of the "facili-
ties" from which or place where communication is to be
intercepted.12
4. The type of communication to be intercepted."
5. The identity, if known, of person(s) committing the of-
fense and whose communications are to be intercepted."
The applicant also must certify three other factors. First, the
applicant must set forth the time period within which the intercep-
tion will occur.15 Second, the applicant must give a complete state-
ment of previous applications made to either state or federal courts
involving the same parties, facilities and places, and any actions
taken by a judge pursuant to such applications." Finally, if the ap-
plication is a request to extend a prior wiretap, there must be a pro-
gress report on the original interception and an explanation as to
why results were not achieved during the original period.'
The court may enter an ex parte order granting the interception
if it is satisfied that one or more controlled substance crimes is, has
or will occur. The court must certify probable cause and necessity
for the wiretap. The order must also delineate the following factors:
(a) The identity, if known, of the person whose communications
are to be intercepted, or if the identity is not known, then that
information relating to the person's identity known to the
8. Id. § 620(b).
9. Id. § 629(c).
10. Id. § 629(d)(1).
11. Id. § 629(d)(2).
12. Id. § 629(d)(3).
13. Id. § 629(d)(4).
14. Id. § 629(d)(5).
15. Id. § 629(e).
16. Id. § 629(0.
17. Id. § 629 (g).
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applicant.
(b) The nature and location of the communication facilities as to
which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted.
(c) A particular description of the type of communication sought
to be intercepted, and a statement of the illegal activities to
which it relates.
(d) The identity of the agency authorized to intercept the com-
munications and of the person making the application.
(e) The period of time during which the interception is author-
ized including a statement as to whether or not the interception
shall automatically terminate when the described communica-
tion has been first obtained. 8
The Act also provides for an emergency oral approval of an order
allowing interception when emergency factors are apparent.19
The maximum duration permitted for a wiretap is thirty days
or as soon as the goal of the interception is achieved.2 0 Law enforce-
ment officials, upon signing the order, may immediately commence
the interception process and must minimize irrelevant or privileged
conversations.
The law enforcement agency executing the order must periodi-
cally report to the court at a minimum of every seventy-two hours.2 1
In addition, an annual report of statewide wiretap activity must be
filed with the Legislature, the Judicial Council and the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts.
22
Within at least ninety days after the cessation of the inter-
cepting activity, the enforcement agency must file an inventory of the
interception and serve it on each of the intercepted parties.2 3 If the
information obtained through the wiretap is to be used in court pro-
ceedings, the agency must also furnish a transcript of the wire con-
versations to the parties.24 Revelation of the contents of the intercep-
tion is forbidden, except under the most strictly delineated
circumstances.2" The defendant's, remedy for an illegally conducted
wiretap is a motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section
18. Id. § 629.04(a)-(e).
19. Id. § 629.06.
20. Id. § 629.08.
21. Id. § 629.10.
22. Id. § 629.12.
23. Id. § 629.18.
24. Id. § 629.20.
25. Id. §§ 629.24, 629.26, 629.28.
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There are three significant differences in the California Act.
The California legislation, unlike its federal counterpart, has an
added feature regarding "privileged communications." ' This unique
provision requires law enforcement to go "off line" and "on line"
when privileged conversations are taking place.28
The California Act, also unlike the federal counterpart, forbids
the use of derivative evidence of non-specified crimes, unless there is
an independent source or the evidence inevitably would have been
discovered. 9 Basically, this provision precludes the use of evidence
gathered by the interception as it relates to criminal activity not de-
lineated as the targeted drug offenses, unless law enforcement offi-
cials reasonably could have gathered this evidence in another
manner.
Finally, the California Act forbids covert entry to affect the
purposes of the wiretap. 0
II. OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES RAISED BY THE
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATION
A. Overall Constitutionality of the Act
The wording of the California Act closely parallels Title III.
Title III encourages states to adopt parallel statutes and the Califor-
nia Legislature was mindful of this when enacting its statute.3 '
While no federal case has mounted a broad, facial attack of Title III
in the United States Supreme Court, the California Act will proba-
bly not escape such challenge before the California Supreme Court.
Title III came under immediate constitutional scrutiny at the
district court and court of appeal levels. The ensuing legal attacks
were based on prior United States Supreme Court holdings relative
to privacy expectations and focused on particular sections of the leg-
islation. A frontal attack, questioning the social benefit of electronic
invasions, never materialized.
In questioning Title III's constitutionality, defense practitioners
looked to two United States Supreme Court decisions to buttress
26. Id. § 629.22.
27. Id. § 629.30.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 629.32(b).
30. Id. § 629.39.
31. Senate Committee on Judiciary, supra note 5.
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their attacks. In the decision of Berger v. New York,"2 the Court
struck down the New York Wiretap statute on the basis of numerous
deficiencies. Such deficiencies included the failure to require specifi-
cation of the crime targeted, the sixty-day length of the tap, auto-
matic review of the intrusion and the failure of the statute to require
an inventory upon completion.
A second decision announced that same year, Katz v. United
States,8" provided the Court with an opportunity to develop its
landmark test for the privacy expectations of citizens. In that case,
an electronic listening device was attached to the top of a phone
booth and conversations were intercepted without the benefit of a
search warrant. The Court emphasized that the protections available
under the fourth amendment are personal, and that what an individ-
ual seeks to keep private, regardless of the location, should remain
so. The Court did note, however, that such intercepted evidence
might have been admissible in court if obtained pursuant to a duly
authorized warrant. Legislation leading to the approval of Title III
immediately followed these decisions.
Thus, in the early decision of United States v. Whittaker,3 4 a
district court in Pennsylvania found Title III unconstitutionally
broad. The ruling was based on Berger and Katz. Specifically, the
court in Whittaker found three defects in Title III that ran afoul of
the rules enunciated in those cases. First, the court found the thirty-
day period of interception to be unduly extensive. Next, it found that
the failure to provide standards provided unguided discretion for law
enforcement. Finally, Title III failed to provide prompt notice of in-
terference. This decision was quickly overruled. In United States v.
Cafero,"8 the Third Circuit overruled Whittaker and the stage was
set for further constitutional attacks.
The court in Cafero found that the Constitution did not fore-
close the use of electronic surveillance so long as proper procedures
were implemented. The court explained that Title III required a
careful and complete delineation of facts and circumstances underly-
ing probable cause. Moreover, the court found that the time limita-
tion of thirty days or less was reasonable. The court explained:
Carte blanche is given no one. Executing officers are not free to
intercept beyond attainment of their objective for an hour, a
32. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
33. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
34. 343 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
35. 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973).
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day, seven days, or twenty-nine days. They are allotted time to
achieve an objective, period. Should they intercept beyond this
time, they have violated the Act."
The defendant in Cafero had also challenged Title III on the
ground that termination of the interception was illusory in light of
the extension provisions. The court concluded that Title III did sat-
isfactorily require new showings of probable cause to obtain an ex-
tension, but acknowledged that " '[b]ootstrapping', the phenomenon
of one interception begetting another in the guise of probable cause,
may occur."" 7
Traditionally, Title III has been interpreted as striking a deli-
cate balance between the legitimate interests of law enforcement and
the privacy rights of individuals.3 8 Unfortunately, the courts have
paid little more than lip service to the privacy interests. For example,
in United States v. Kalustian,3 ' the Court noted:
The restraint with which such authority was created reflects the
legitimate fears with which a free society entertains the use of
electronic surveillance. As stated in Berger, . . . "Few threats
to liberty exist which are greater than that posed by the use of
eavesdropping devices."4
The California Constitution, article I, section 1, provides specif-
ically for a right of privacy.'" The protection has afforded California
citizens with extensive privacy rights not enjoyed in any other state.
While the California Supreme Court has always enforced the
standard enunciated in Katz, the court has developed its own body of
rules on privacy matters that exceed the protections provided in
Katz."2 With this, California has given succor to those persons who
desire to keep their matters within their residence.'
Prior to the addition of Proposition 8, the Victim's Bill of
Rights, to the California Constitution, the question of wiretapping
36. Id. at 496.
37. Id. at 497.
38. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 151 (1974).
39. 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1976).
40. Id. at 588.
41. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1974). "All people ... have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting prop-
erty, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness and privacy." Id.
42. See, e.g., People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431
(1979); Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779,
172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
43. See generally, Developments in the Law, The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
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might have been clear cut. The California Supreme Court might
have simply voided the wiretap legislation on grounds that it was
violative of the privacy guarantees contained in the California Con-
stitution. The court also may have looked at the long established tra-
dition of upholding the state Constitution on "separate and indepen-
dent grounds" and voided the California Act. This powerful judicial
vehicle for the expansion of liberty interests in California was first
advanced by the state Supreme Court in California v. Krivda4" and
People v. Brisendine." Under this constitutional doctrine, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court developed its own body of privacy rights that
were more expansive than those promulgated by the United States
Supreme Court pursuant to the federal Constitution.
However, in 1982, California voters enacted Proposition 8,
which added the following language to the state Constitution:
Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted by two-thirds
vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature, rele-
vant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding
46
In essence, this provision abolished the tradition of a separate
and independent California Constitution as it relates to California's
search and seizure matters. Specifically, in the case of In re Lance
W., the California Supreme Court declared that the California
standard for the exclusion of illegally seized evidence was to be con-
gruent with the federal standard. The court explained:
What Proposition 8 does is to eliminate a judicially created rem-
edy for violations of the search and seizure provisions of the fed-
eral or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of evidence so
obtained, except to the extent that exclusion remains federally
compelled.' 8
Thus, Lance W. severely restricts potential challenges to the
Wiretap Act under the California Constitution. The Act must be
evaluated according to federal law and evidentiary exclusions must
be limited to violations of the fourth amendment."9 However, Lance
W. does leave open the prospect of civil actions for violations of Cali-
44. 409 U.S. 33 (1972), remanded sub. nor., 8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 521, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 919 (1973).
45. 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1973).
46. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 28(d) (1982).
47. 37 Cal. 3d 873, 694 P.2d 744, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1985).
48. Id. at 886-87, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
49. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.22 (West 1988).
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fornia law even when the federal law finds no invasion of privacy.
Accordingly, the only potential challenges to this Act might be a
taxpayer suit to declare the entire Act in violation of article I, section
I of the California Constitution and a detailed, case-by-case chal-
lenge to key portions of the Act.
B. The Sweep of the Two Statutes
The California and federal statutes pursue different objectives.
Title III focuses primarily on crimes of international consequence,
interstate racketeering, extortion and drug offenses."0 In contrast, the
California Act targets crime involving four controlled substances:
heroin, cocaine, PCP and methamphetamine5 1
Title III is aimed at major interstate offenses. However, the
enumerated offenses are so broad in their focus that renewal of the
wiretap or a derivative evidentiary question rarely arises. For exam-
ple, a case could commence under the auspices of gathering evidence
on a cocaine distribution network. During the course of the intercep-
tion process, conversations might disclose an extortion scheme. As a
result of the broad coverage of the Title III enumerated offenses,
federal courts would have little or no difficulty permitting the admis-
sion of such derivative evidence at trial.
The California Act, on the other hand, has a specific and nar-
row sweep. Specifically, the Act is limited to several enumerated con-
trolled substance offenses. The California Act also specifically for-
bids the use of intercepted evidence of crimes other than the crime or
crimes described in the wiretap application, "except where the evi-
dence was obtained through an independent source or inevitably
would have been discovered, and the use is authorized by a judge
who finds that the contents were intercepted in accordance with this
chapter."52
The process established by the California Legislature is illusory
in light of the trend toward upholding validly issued orders for elec-
tronic interception. The procedure for determining whether deriva-
tive evidence was lawfully obtained requires the courts to evaluate an
interception that has already run its course. A brief review of na-
tional statistics illustrates the tendency of courts to admit wiretap
evidence. In 1987, 673 orders were sought from judges within the
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-63 (West Supp. IV 1986); 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-48 (1982).
51. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989).
52. Id. § 629.32(b).
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thirty-three jurisdictions permitting wiretap surveillance.53 Of those,
no orders were denied.54 Of the 673 orders, fifty-six percent of the
wiretaps were geared toward narcotics offenses; 5 twenty percent
were geared toward gambling offenses and nine percent were geared
toward racketeering offenses. During the calendar year 1986, no mo-
tions to suppress electronically intercepted conversations were
granted in federal court. 6
The message to lawyers seeking to suppress wiretap evidence is
predictable: the motion may be well written, but will probably re-
ceive short shrift in the courts. The trend in California, under the
dual exceptions for "independent source" and "inevitable discovery,"
casts a long shadow on the hopes of anyone seeking suppression of
derivative evidence.
Constitutionally, both the independent source and inevitable
discovery exceptions carry tremendous significance. In the federal
case of Nardone v. United States,57 the government utilized evidence
from an illegal wiretap. The question was whether the case against
the defendant could have been proven independent of the inadmissi-
ble evidence. In this case, the government utilized evidence from an
illegal wiretap. The court stated:
Here, as in the Silverthorne case, the facts improperly obtained
do not "become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is
gained from an independent source they may be proved like any
others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own
wrong cannot be used by it" simply because it is used deriva-
tively. 251 U.S. 385, 392.
In practice this generalized statement may conceal concrete
complexities. Sophisticated argument may prove a causal con-
nection between information obtained through illicit wire-tap-
ping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense,
however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint. A sensible way of dealing with such a situa-
tion-fair to the intendment of § 605, but fair also to the pur-
poses of the criminal law-ought to be within the reach of ex-
perienced trial judges. The burden is, of course, on the accused
in the first instance to prove to the trial court's satisfaction that
53. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR OR-
DERS AUTHORIZING OR APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE, ORAL OR ELECTRONIC
COMMUNICATIONS 20 (1987) [hereinafter REPORT ON APPLICATIONS].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 22.
57. 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
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wire-tapping was unlawfully employed. Once that is estab-
lished-as was plainly done here-the trial judge must give op-
portunity, however closely confined, to the accused to prove that
a substantial portion of the case against him was a fruit of the
poisonous tree. This leaves ample opportunity to the Govern-
ment to convince the trial court that its proof had an indepen-
dent origin."
The California wiretap statute requires that the trial court
make a finding that there was an independent source for the evidence
or that the evidence would have inevitably been discovered. Nardone
provides a fair indication of the attenuation needed to remove the
taint of illegality.
Another example of the taint issue was seen in the federal case
of Gelbard v. United States." In that case, the United States Su-
preme Court foreclosed the testimony of a grand jury witness and,
therefore, sanctioned a refusal to testify where the evidence was ob-
tained from an illegal electronic surveillance.
The concept of inevitable discovery was discussed in the federal
case of Nix v. Williams." In that case, the United States Supreme
Court defined the concept as follows:
[1]f the government can prove that the evidence would have been
obtained inevitably and, therefore, would have been admitted
regardless of any over-reaching by the police, there is no ra-
tional basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to en-
sure the fairness of the trial proceedings.6"
More recently, the Court in the case of Murray v. United
States, 2 refined the two concepts of independant source and inevita-
ble discovery. The Court noted:
The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct requirements,
is in reality an extrapolation from the independant source doc-
trine. Since the tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact
discovered through an independant source, it should be admissi-
ble if it inevitably would have been discovered.63
California courts have adopted this line of reasoning and have
implemented the federal standards for independent source and inevi-
58. Id. at 341.
59. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
60. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
61. Id. at 447.
62. 108 S. Ct. 2529 (1988).
63. Id. at 2534.
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table discovery.
C. Standing to Make the Motion to Suppress
Title III contains its own suppression procedure." The rule
permits an "aggrieved person" to move for suppression. An "ag-
grieved person" is defined as "a person who was a party to any in-
tercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against
whom the interception was directed.""
Traditional federal standards of "standing" apply in motions to
suppress contested wiretaps. This means that pursuant to Alderman
v. United States" and Rakas v. Illinois,67 the person requesting
suppression must demonstrate either that he or she is an interceptee
or the person is closely associated with the targeted facility.68
The California Act was framed in less precise terms. Penal
Code Section 629.22 provides, in part, as follows:
Any person .. .may move to suppress some or all of the con-
tents of any intercepted wire communications, or evidence de-
rived therefrom, only on the basis that the contents or evidence
were obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution or of this chapter. 9
The words "any person" are susceptible to more than one inter-
pretation. Since the primary conclusion of In re Lance W. was that
California's constitutional rule was congruent with the federal rule
forbidding vicarious standing, an argument might be made that "any
person" must be someone with direct standing. This argument would
deny standing to non-intercepted co-defendants or co-conspirators
who were derivatively implicated.
On the other hand, an argument could be made that the lan-
guage employed in the Act provides for expanded standing. The ar-
gument would be that by referring to "any person," rather than an
"aggrieved person" as in the federal Act, the California Legislature
indicated its intention to expand standing beyond the narrow con-
64. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a), (b), (c) (1970).
65. Id. § 2510(11) (Supp. IV 1986).
66. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
67. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
68. While prosecutors have traditionally adhered to this view, some doubt was cast on
this view by the United States Supreme Court decision of United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S.
413, 432-33 (1977). In footnote 22, the majority indicates that because 18 U.S.C. § 2518
(10)(a) (1982) provides for suppression of illegally seized oral or wire communication, or "evi-
dence derived therefrom," other interceptees have standing.
69. CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.22 (West Supp. 1989) (emphasis added).
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fines of Lance W. Moreover, it may further be argued that since the
Act passed by more than a two-thirds majority in the California
Legislature, it accordingly altered the standing requirement of Lance
W. This argument is premised on the fact that Proposition 8 may be
amended by a two-thirds vote of the California Legislature.
D. Technical Requirements
The California courts will be confronted with challenges in
three specific technical areas. The courts are likely to rely heavily on
federal interpretations of Title III to resolve these challenges. These
areas of potential contest include the naming of persons affected
when determining probable cause, the filing of the post-interception
inventory, and the problem of covert entry to affect the interception.
Title III and the California Act are virtually identical in their
language concerning the identification of persons perceived to be po-
tential interceptees. Often, during the course of an interception, per-
sons who are not named as targets become involved in the criminal
conduct. While the California courts have not had an opportunity to
determine the legality of this process, the federal courts have spoken
clearly.
This problem was addressed in the case of United States v.
Donovan. In that case, both the district court and court of appeals
sustained a motion to suppress because the investigators failed to
name the defendants as potential interceptees in the application for
the intercept order.
The United States Supreme Court considered the legislative his-
tory of Title III and determined that this failure to identify did not
constitute an adequate ground to suppress. Defense counsel at-
tempted to analogize the violation with that forbidden in United
States v. Giordano."1 In that case, the Department of Justice failed
to designate a wiretap applicant and this failure led to suppression of
the intercepted evidence. In Donovan, the Court reasoned that un-
like Giordano, the failure to identify persons to be intercepted was
not a violation of precondition requirements and, further, it failed to
play a " 'central, or even functional, role in guarding against unwar-
ranted use of wiretapping or electronic surveillance.' "7"
The California courts would likely view a non-targeted person's
70. 429 U.S. 413 (1974).
71. 416 U.S. 505 (1974).
72. 429 U.S. at 437 (citing United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578 (1974)). See also
United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1979).
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motion to suppress in the same fashion. This is because the courts
would also view the activity as an unimportant part of the process.
A second technical requirement the government must follow
under both Title III and the California Act is the post-interception
inventory process. This process requires law enforcement officials to
file notice with the court that conversations were intercepted. Unless
good cause is shown, the court requires persons affected to be served
with notice that their conversations were intercepted. This require-
ment was established to comply with the notion that potential grand
jury targets should be treated adequately and informed that certain
covert investigation techniques were used against them. The Con-
gressional Record is replete with discussions of situations in which
inventories should not have been served. 73 For example, publication
of the inventory may be adverse to the business reputation of the
callers. On the other hand, legitimate fears regarding the failure to
file the inventory are frequently raised. Also discussed is the view
that if the government has willfully breached the very stringent tech-
nical requirements of Title III, suppression of the conversations
would be the only remedy.
But in United States v. Donovan, the Court specifically held
that the inventory requirement was one of the requirements that did
not necessitate suppression if unfulfilled since it neither violates a
precondition of an interception order nor goes to a central role in the
surveillance process.
However, Donovan left the issues of identification and inven-
tory unresolved in one critical area. That is, if the government inten-
tionally and in bad faith omitted certain names, or conspired to de-
prive the district court judge of those names, or conspired to deprive
an interceptee of notice, would suppression be appropriate? The
Court suggests that if actual prejudice can be articulated, then sup-
pression may be in order.74 Given the fact, however, that the Cali-
fornia Act provides for complete discovery of the intercepted conver-
sation, then prejudice, if any, would be slight. Accordingly, it would
be difficult under the California Act to provide defense counsel a
basis on which to suppress the entire interception.
Finally, issues involving the covert entry to execute surveillance
orders is one of major importance. The United States Supreme
Court, in Dalia v. United States,'7 held that covert entry was per-
73. 114 CONG. REC. 14,476 (1968); Donovan, 429 U.S. at 430 n.20.
74. Donovan, 429 U.S. at 439 n.29.
75. 441 U.S. 238 (1979).
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missible under Title III. The California Legislature strictly forbade
this approach in Penal Code Section 629.39. This means that since
this activity is proscribed, any evidence suggesting covert entry would
give rise to suppression of the conversations. This conclusion is also
supported by California's high regard for privacy interests.
E. Probable Cause Problems
Probable cause is statutorily required by Title III and the Cali-
fornia Wiretap Act before an intercept order will be issued. The
probable cause requirement has two separate analyses. The first is
the overall evaluation of the underlying facts, including the suspected
crimes, the persons to be targeted, the location and layout of the fa-
cility, and the type of conversations to be seized. The second prong of
the inquiry is the so-called "necessity" prong, which requires law
enforcement officials to detail reasons that conventional investigative
techniques will not work or are too dangerous to attempt.
"Probable cause" hinges upon the definition coined by the
United States Supreme Court."' When Title III was adopted in
1968, the definition for probable cause was the Aguilar-Spinelli"
standard that required a search warrant applicant to disclose the fac-
tual reliability of his or her information and to disclose the credibil-
ity of the informant. By adhering to the precise wording of Title III
and by utilizing the Aguilar-Spinelli template, the federal courts
were required to screen applications carefully. In 1983, the United
States Supreme Court modified its test for probable cause in the case
of Gates v. Illinois. In that case, the standard was relaxed to provide
that probable cause need not be mechanically weighed, and instead
the courts need only look to the "totality of the circumstances" in
determining whether probable cause exists.7
Curiously, the decision in Gates had little impact on the rate of
rejection of warrants for electronic interception. A review of the ten-
year statistics from the United States Administrative Office of Courts
notes the following rate of rejection:79
76. The district court must enter an order that "probable cause" exists. This require-
ment necessarily hinges on the current definition of that term by the United States Supreme
Court.
77. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
78. Gates v. Illinois, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
79. See REPORT ON APPLICATIONS, supra note 53, at 19.
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Year Applications Granted Denied %Denied
1977-1983 4,132 4,128 4 .09%
1984-1987 3,017 3,012 5 .16%
As specifically articulated by the Court in United States v.
Camp,8" the determination by a judge in issuing an intercept order is
a fluid process in which great deference is paid to the expertise of
the officials seeking the intercept order. The Court noted:
The task of the issuing [judge] is simply to make a practical,
commonsense decision whether, given all of the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit before him .. . there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is sim-
ply to ensure that the [judge] had a "substantial basis for ...
conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed .8
This evaluation process encompasses the statutory mandate of Title
III and the holding of Gates.
There are strong policy reasons for seeking a departure from
the Gates standard in the electronic interception context. California
courts may be presented with some of these arguments to override
Gates in a challenge to the California Act. The policy reasons in-
clude the following four considerations.
First, as pointed out in Gates, the applicant seeking the search
warrant might not be the highest trained investigator.8 2 Common
sense dictates that police department training standards vary accord-
ing to jurisdiction. In the electronic monitoring arena, Title III and
the California Act require a lawyer within the highest echelons of
prosecutorial service to seek the application. The statutes also re-
quire advanced training of such persons responsible for the actual
wiretapping. 3
Second, Gates also suggests that in some jurisdictions the magis-
trate signing the warrants might not be a lawyer. 84 This leads to a
departure from a rigorous formulation of probable cause. In the elec-
tronic interception area, the order may only be signed by a "judge" 5
or, in California, a superior court judge.
Third, of major concern in Gates was the preference for war-
80. 723 F.2d 741, 745 (9th Cir. 1984).
81. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983)).
82. 462 U.S. at 235.
83. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.44(a)(b) (West 1988).
84. 462 U.S. at 235.
85. U.S. CONST. art. III.
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rants.' The fear was that by rejecting warrants, law enforcement
officials would rely on less neutrally detached methods of gathering
the evidence. In the electronic surveillance arena, the only way to
garner evidence is to do so through the use of the order of
interception.
Finally, a physical search is a one-time intrusion.87 While it
may have the consequence of upsetting the target's life, it ceases
within a short number of hours. But an electronic surveillance can
continue for weeks. A ten-year survey disclosed that wiretaps aver-
age twenty-five days per order. In one New Jersey district court au-
thorization, the tap remained on the line for 258 days.88 This is
hardly the one-time intrusion contemplated by the authors of the
Gates opinion.
Still, it is unlikely that the United States Supreme Court or the
California Supreme Court will require a higher standard for appli-
cations and will distinguish the holding of Gates in the electronic
interception area. Alternatively, in lieu of a broad based challenge to
the Gates standard, the California courts, like the federal courts, will
insist on strict compliance with the probable cause formulation
within their respective acts. Both Title III and the California Act
require law enforcement officials to give a full and complete state-
ment of the facts and circumstances surrounding the situation
prompting the need for electronic intrusion. In evaluating the appli-
cation, the California courts will probably look to federal decisions
for guidance.
Issues surrounding three probable cause factors have frequently
arisen in the federal context. These factors include the conclusory
statement in the application, the staleness of the information, and the
location of the tap. First, the federal courts have not favored the use
of conclusory language in applications. When Title III and the Cali-
fornia Act insist on "facts and circumstances," bald assertions will
not suffice. For example, under the necessity prong, the court in
United States v. Kalustian"' stated:
In effect the Government's position is that all gambling conspir-
acies are tough to crack, so the Government need show only the
probability that illegal gambling is afoot to justify electronic
surveillance. Title III does not support that view." °
86. 462 U.S. at 236.
87. By definition, as in Gates, the intrusion was a one-time intrusion.
88. REPORT ON APPLICATIONS, supra note 53, at 38.
89. 529 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1975).
90. Id. at 589.
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A second factor arising in federal court is that of the staleness of
the received information. The court in United States v. Martino9
pointed out that "[i]t is elementary that the probable cause needed to
validate the issuance of an authorization for a wiretap must exist at
the time of issuance." 9 In this connection, the court must review the
age of the facts, the potential transitory nature of the alleged conduct
and the recency of the confidential informant's observations.
A final factor is the issuance of the order for "facilities as to
which, or the place," where the communication is to be intercepted.9"
"Facilities," as used in this context, refers to the electronic device for
carrying the communication. The critical point is that either the fa-
cility or the location must be clearly identified. Whether this means
that there has to be prior contact on a particular facility (telephone
number) is a question yet to be resolved. What is clear, however, is
that most courts look to the address of the target to provide guidance.
For example, in United States v. Adams,94 the court was provided
with ample evidence that the location was one that was being uti-
lized regularly for drug purchases. This intercept accordingly passed
muster.
The concept of "necessity" for the authorization is one with
which the courts have constantly grappled. Under both Title III and
the California Act, the applicant must allege and the court must cer-
tify that "normal investigative procedures have been tried and have
failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be
too dangerous."9 In cases in which "necessity" has been challenged,
courts have been quick to point out several issues.
First, courts have held in numerous cases that while electronic
surveillance should not be the first investigative tool of choice, law
enforcement officials need not wait for every aspect to fail before
utilizing it."' For example, in United States v. Bailey,97 the court
stated that "the necessity requirement is also to be interpreted in a
practical, common sense fashion, and need not therefore be used only
as a last resort."9. In Bailey, a lengthy one-and-one-half year inves-
tigation yielded little evidence. A decoder was placed on the touch-
91. 664 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1981).
92. Id. at 866 (citations omitted).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4)(b) (1982).
94. 759 F.2d 1099 (3d Cir. 1985).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c) (1982); CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.02(d) (West Supp. 1989).
96. See United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Smith,
519 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Santora, 600 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979).
97. 607 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1979).
98. Id. at 241-42.
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tone phone. The decoder was promptly discovered. Informants could
not permeate the veil of the activities. The court found that the ac-
tions, documented by a thirty-two page affidavit, constituted suffi-
cient necessity for the wiretap, which was finally installed.
Second, the affidavit must set forth facts that clearly establish
that there is compliance with the necessity requirement. Often, ap-
plicants seeking a wiretap rely on the fact that certain classes of
cases must, by their very nature, require electronic intrusion. The
courts have rejected this notion in many cases and require specific
facts to bolster a showing of necessity. For example, in the case of
United States v. Ippolito," the court explained the reasons for the
requirement:
The reason for the requiring specificity is to prevent the govern-
ment from making general allegations about classes of cases and
thereby sidestepping the requirement that there be necessity in
the particular investigation in which a wiretap is sought."°
Conclusory language within the application is the most common
failure. In the case of United States v. Spagnuolo,0 the court was
met with an application that failed to factually describe why normal
investigative procedures would not work. Moreover, the application
was boilerplate and conclusory in its assertions. The Court held:
We start by indicating that the common thread running through
the Kerrigan line of decisions is that the affidavit, read in its
entirety, must give a factual basis sufficient to show that ordi-
nary investigative procedures have failed or will fail in the par-
ticular case at hand. This may be accomplished in various ways,
including, but not limited to, descriptions of the particular illicit
operation's peculiarities which necessitate a wiretap and of the
heretofore unsuccessful investigatory efforts of the police. ...
An affidavit composed solely of conclusions unsupported by par-
ticular facts gives no basis for a determination of compliance
with Section 2518(1)(c). °2
Third, the same showing of necessity is required as to each co-
conspirator to be included and as to each extension order. The court
found that in United States v. Abascal,103 a mere desire to tap all co-
conspirators was not enough of the required necessity to allow a tap
99. 774 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1985).
100. Id. at 1486.
101. 549 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1977).
102. Id. at 710.
103. 564 F.2d 821, 826 (9th Cir. 1977).
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to go forth.
Finally, it appears that if the application factually discloses in-
formation relative to a particular target, and there has been a failure
of less intrusive means of infiltration, a showing of necessity will be
complete. The courts do not accord much weight to defense counsel's
second guessing of professional investigators such as the F.B.I. and
D.E.A. In more than one case, the courts have focused on proving
the necessity requirement at the time of the application, rather than
on what may have developed or what other techniques defense coun-
sel now suggests could or should have been utilized at the time the
warrant was requested. '0
If, however, information presented to the judge is materially
false and misleading, the defendant still maintains the right to chal-
lenge the factual veracity of the application pursuant to Franks v.
Delaware.10 5 An attack on an application on the basis that it rests on
false and material statements can apply to overall probable cause or
to the necessity prong of the requirement.
In the case of United States v. Perdomo,0 6 the court set forth
five essential requirements for a Franks hearing:
(1) the defendant must allege specifically what portions of the
warrant affidavit are claimed to be false; (2) the defendant must
contend that the false statements or omissions were deliberately
or recklessly made; (3) a detailed offer of proof, including affi-
davits, must accompany the allegations; (4) the veracity of only
the affiant must be challenged; (5) the challenged statements
must be necessary to find probable cause.'
In the case of United States v. Ippolito, the defense proved that
the government used materially false statements regarding an in-
former. This severely crippled the necessity prong of the govern-
ment's case, and the wiretap was suppressed.
The most common failure in a Franks motion is simply failing
to make a clear offer of proof to upset the balance in finding proba-
ble cause. There are always numerous errors in the affidavits, which
often run 80-100 pages in length. The critical feature is finding a
pivotal issue that can sway the balance toward requiring an eviden-
tiary hearing.
The probable cause and necessity elements of a wiretap case
104. E.g., United States v. Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418, 1509 (S.D. Cal. 1986); United
States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1978).
105. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
106. 800 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1986).
107. Id. at 920.
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will be the most fruitful portion for litigation concerning the Califor-
nia Act. With California's liberal criminal defense discovery law,
most attention will probably be focused on the application of the
Franks hearing.
F. The Minimization Requirement
Both Title III and the California Act require that the inter-
cepting agents "minimize the interception of communications not
otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must termi-
nate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in
thirty days." ' 08 There is by statute, therefore, a quantitative measure
for minimizing the interference and by case law, a qualitative
measure.
The quantitative measurement of minimization is thirty days or
whenever the objective is attained. This assumes several features re-
quiring closer examination. First, the thirty-day period is subject to
a new application for extension. Second, the "attainment of the goal"
is sometimes meaningless since the goals may have been set forth in
very broad strokes. For example, under federal law, if the applicant
identified the targeted crime as a "continuing criminal enterprise"1 9
and wished the court to authorize a tap to "learn of the web of the
cocaine dealings of X," the goal could never completely be obtained
but the basis for numerous extensions has been established. Rather
than approaching the problem in terms of a minimization problem, a
judge might instead scrutinize the law as a probable cause or "gen-
eral warrant" problem devoid of any specificity relative to known
facts.11 o
Appellate courts reviewing Title III have not adopted a per se
rule regarding the length of legal interception. In the case of United
States v. Tortorello,"' the court rejected a contention that a five
month, twenty day tap was unreasonable. A similar challenge to a
fifty-nine day tap was rejected in United States v. Manfredi.12
The qualitative measure of minimization is more troublesome
and will be a major issue in the interpretation of the California Act.
In the landmark case of Scott v. United States,"3 the United States
108. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 629.08 (West Supp.
1989).
109. 21 U.S.C. § 844 (1982).
110. See generally Schwartz, supra note 4.
111. 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1973).
112. 488 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1973).
113. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
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Supreme Court refused to paint a bright line to evaluate the minimi-
zation efforts mandated by Title III since a "strict percentage" rule
would be counterproductive. Rather, the Court identified four criti-
cal areas.
First, according to Scott, the hearing court must look at the ob-
jective facts and circumstances rather than the subjective intent man-
ifested by the officer." 4 By examining the facts known to the officer,
a clearer picture of what was reasonable emerges.
Second, there should be a flexible approach in determining
whether reasonableness was proper in a given case.1 In Scott, the
agents "seized" every conversation during the course of a one month
wiretap. Percentages of calls intercepted are not the sole determining
factor for the court.
Third, the type of facility is important. 16 The Court pointed
out that if the phone was a public telephone suspected of being com-
monly used by illegal gamblers, minimization would be greater than
if the phone was located at the alleged residence of a perceived king-
pin in a drug conspiracy.
Finally, the court looks to events during the early stage of the
interception to see whether the calls can be categorized as either
nonpertinent, and therefore minimized, or calls of great relevance.
During the life of the tap, the court should examine the degree of
minimization utilized on non-pertinent calls.
The Scott decision was not greeted with high praise from two
members of the Court. Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justice
Marshall, dissented as follows:
The Court today eviscerates this congressionally mandated pro-
tection of individual privacy, marking the third decision in
which the Court has disregarded or diluted congressionally es-
tablished safeguards designed to prevent Government electronic
surveillance from becoming the abhorred general warrant which
historically had destroyed the cherished expectation of privacy
in the home.11
Both the dissenters and the petitioners in Scott advanced the
notion that the subjective intent of the agents was critical. In other
words, if the agents attempted in good faith to minimize, then mental
state is relevant to a determination by the court on the issue of sup-
114. Id. at 136.
115. Id. at 139-140.
116. Id. at 140-141.
117. Id. at 143-144.
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pression. The majority deferred this reasoning by holding that after
a violation had been proven, the question of good faith was then to
be considered in determining whether suppression was appropriate.
This means, of course, that the government could still have
committed a violation of the minimization mandate. If it was com-
mitted in good faith, however, the suppression of the intercepted calls
may not be required.
The good faith standard did have a life prior to Scott. In the
case of United States v. Turner,11 the court explored a tap lasting
some forty days. The agents intercepted 1,788 conversations of which
539 were busy signals, wrong numbers or misdials. Of the remaining
conversations, 670 lasted one minute and 185, or one-third of the
other 589 were minimized. The court held:
In a case where it is clear that the minimization provision of the
order was disregarded by the Government throughout the pe-
riod covered by the order, a total suppression might well be ap-
propriate. We assume, arguendo, that such should be the rule.
Here, however, the district court found reasonable and good-
faith effort on the part of the Government to comply with the
orders authorizing the interceptions." 9
A more particular problem of minimization arises when agents
intercept privileged calls. Originally, the American Bar Association's
Section on Criminal Justice drafted a major portion of what was to
become Title III.20 Part of the ABA Standard Relating to Elec-
tronic Surveillance specified the prohibition against tapping other-
wise privileged conversations. Currently, Standard 2-5.10 provides:
(a) No order should be permitted authorizing or approving the
overhearing or recording of communications over a facility or in
a place primarily used by licensed physicians, licensed lawyers,
practicing clergymen, or other professionals whose communica-
tions are deemed to be privileged under applicable state law, in
a place used primarily for habitation by a husband and wife,
unless, in addition to the showings required under standards 2-
5.3 and 2-5.4, the applicant establishes probable cause to believe
that there is a special need to conduct such surveillance.
(b) No otherwise privileged wire or oral communication over-
heard in accordance with or in violation of these standards
118. 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1975).
119. Id. at 156.
120. For a general history of formulation of Title III, see Schwartz, supra note 4.
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should lose its privileged character. 12 1
Indeed, in the early phases of implementation of Title III, the
government was very reluctant to pursue privileged conversations.
For example, the agents in United States v. Chavez122 were cau-
tioned by the instructing agent to terminate any lawyer-client calls
or priest-penitent calls. No such instructions are in operation pres-
ently. The courts have accepted the government's premise that attor-
neys may well be part of a conspiracy and, therefore, their calls are
not worthy of termination.1 2 1
The California Act parts company with Title III on this point.
The California law specifically describes how minimization of privi-
leged communications shall occur. The Legislature has described an
"off-line" and "on-line" process that is a compromise to many, but
should provide some needed protections.
Under federal law, the trial court does not have to hold a mini-
mization hearing simply because the defendant has so requested. In-
stead, the defendant must make an extensive showing of potential
violations of the minimization requirement. The procedural steps in
such a hearing were outlined in the case of United States v.
Orozco: 1
2 4
The government has the burden of proof in the first instance to
show that the minimization requirement was met. . . . Compli-
ance with the minimization requirement is demonstrated by a
showing that agents' minimization efforts were reasonable
under the circumstances. . . . There is no single formula that
can be applied to determine whether agents made reasonable
efforts to minimize the seizure of unauthorized conversations
while conducting the wiretaps. The reasonableness of their ef-
forts will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case . ..
The question of whether an evidentiary hearing on a mo-
tion to suppress is appropriate rests on the reasoned discretion
of the district court. . . . The extent of inquiry to be permitted
during a minimization hearing is also within the court's discre-
tion. . . . A survey of the case law provides no absolute rule as
to when and to what extent an evidentiary hearing should be
121. I ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2-5.10 (2d ed. 1980). See supra notes
2-56 and accompanying text.
122. 533 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1976).
123. United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. DePalma,
461 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y., 1978).
124. 630 F. Supp. 1418 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
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conducted in order to assist the court in its determination of the
reasonableness of minimization efforts.1 25
While this procedure might be a potential model for California,
there is no certainty that it will be pursued. Unlike federal law, the
decision to grant an evidentiary hearing is not controlled by the
court. Rather, Penal Code section 1538.5 permits defense counsel to
request a special hearing and the court has no power to deny an
evidentiary presentation regarding any aspect of the wiretap process,
including minimization. What is normally a tight process under Ti-
tle III may be a wide ranging exploration under California law.
III. CONCLUSION
The California Wiretap Act was modeled after Title III of the
federal law. However, unlike the broad sweep of Title III, the Cali-
fornia Act only targets certain drug offenses. Nevertheless, in inter-
preting the California Act, the courts of this state are likely to give
great weight to the decisions of the federal courts.
It is unlikely that the California Act will be declared unconsti-
tutional as against the California Constitution, even though the state
Constitution has a specific provision protecting the privacy of its citi-
zens. Rather, lawyers who litigate in this area will have to be con-
tent with piecemeal, case-by-case attacks on the overall implementa-
tion of the Act. The areas of challenge will probably be limited to
the technical requirements of the Act, the derivative evidence ad-
duced, the formulation of probable cause and minimization.
While the Act has specifically rejected covert entry and across-
the-board interception of privileged conversations, these two conces-
sions to civil liberties are small in comparison to the intrusions likely
to occur. Further, potential amendments aimed at lessening the in-
trusiveness of the Act will probably fail.
Finally, though the California Act is due to sunset on January
1, 1994, not many expect it to fade into the west on that date.
125. Id. at 1537 (citations omitted).
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